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1. SUMMARY: May the SEC, under the aut f the  
Investment Advise~~t, ban a financial publisher from /~ 
publishing truthful information concerning financial 
investments, because of the publisher's prior criminal record? 
GrJ ~ r ~;vl r tJ-~ wi~ ft-._ ~M-0-wr:.J-if ~ CAL 
wtcs LJr""'-j· CJJ..nJ; f k M ~ j, ~ rd..uJ., J.v 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr was an investment 
' . 
advisor registered with the SEC under the Advisors Agt, 15 
u.s.c. 80b-3(c). In 1977 he was convicted of two state 
misdemeanors, for misconduct arising out of his investment 
advisory business, involving personal relationships he had 
with clients. In 1978 he was convicted of two state felonies 
for conduct unrelated to his position as an investment 
'---.. --- --adviser. As a result of these convictions, the SEC began an 
administrative disciplinary proceeding, which found that petr 
aided and abetted violations by one of his companies of the 
antifraud and reporting provisions of the Advisor's Act. The 
SEC found that petr's conduct reflected a "callous disregard" 
for the fiduciary standards required of an investment adviser. 
The SEC then revoked the registration of petr and his company 
----~ 
as an adviser under the Act, and barred petr from associating 
with any investment adviser. Petr did not seek review of the 
SEC'sorder. ~~~-:i"G6-.~~~~ 
~r desisted from giving personal investment advice, but 
II \~ 
he began to publ~ Investment advisory newsletters, and 
solicited subscriptions for a third one. 1 The two newsletters 
1Petr's first newsletter is the Lowe Investment and Financial 
Letter. A typical issue contains general observations on and 
assessments of the securities and bullion markets, a review of 
numerous market indicators, market strategies, and specific 
recommendations for investment. The second publication is the 
Lowe Stock Advisory, which analyzes the securities and bullion 
markets in a similar manner, but specializes in low-priced stocks 
listed on the NYSE and AMEX. Petr also had begun soliciting 
~ubscriptions for the Lowe Stock Chart Service, which contains 
o investment advice. 
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which petr published had subscription lists of approximately 
2500 persons. The newsletters gave reports on economic trends 
and listed the prognoses of various stocks. 
The SEC then brought this present suit. It sued petr in 
EDNY, seeking an injunction to stop petr and his companies 
from publishing investment adviser newsletters, and seeking 
disgorgement of subscription monies that petr had collected. 
The SEC brought its action under the Advisors Act. The Act 
exempts from SEC regulation "the publisher of any bona fide 
newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial publication 
of general and regular circulation." The DC declined to 
enjoin petr's publications. The DC (per Weinstein, C.J.) -------
reasoned that a construction of the Advisers Act which would 
permit the SEC to deny or revoke the registration of an 
advisory publisher on the basis of past misconduct, without 
any showing that the information disseminated had ever been 
false or misleading, would violate the First Amendment. 
The DC adopted an alternative holding. First, if 
~ 
investment advice was merely commercial speech, the total ban 
on petr's publishing which the SEC sought was broader than 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the government's interest. 
The SEC could have forced petr to disclose his adviser-related 
convictions, or it could have waited until petr published 
false or misleading information before punishing him or 
attempting to silence him. 
The DC noted that in In re R. M., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) 
this Court endorsed restrictions upon commercial speech only 
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if the restrictions were "no broader than necessary to prevent 
the deception." Id. at 203. Moreover, th~ iemedy for 
potentially misleading advertising is "in the first instance 
not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of 
disclaimers or explanation." Id. The DC concluded that 
petr's speech, even if merely commercial speech, was lawful 
activity and is not necessarily misleading. As such it could 
not be totally silenced by a prepublication restraint, because 
the government's interest in fair operation of the securities 
markets did not outweigh petr's First Amendment rights. 
The DC next held that petr's newsletters were not ?? 
' t 
commercial speech, but fully protected speech much like an ,(9- ,L 8 
ordinary newspaper. The Supreme Court has defined commercial ----------. 
speech as "speech which 'does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.'" Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,762 
(1976). Investment newsletters, according to the DC, are not 
commercial advertising of a product or service. The publisher 
of a newsletter has the same interest in disseminating his 
newsletter as does a regular newspaper publisher. The 
economic discussion found in petr's newsletters addressed 
issues of public concern, and included commentary on economic 
policy and political trends. The DC held that this was a far 
cry from the commercial advertising addressed in this Court's 
commercial speech cases; thus petr's newsletters were entitled 
to full First Amendment protection. Resp simply failed to 
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overcome the heavy presumption against the prior restraint it 
seeked. 
The DC did not strike down the section of the Advisers 
Act which grants the SEC power to revoke investment adviser 
registration, 15 u.s.c. §80b-6a. Instead the court construed 
those provisions in a way which eliminated the SEC's power to 
revoke an adviser's registration if the adviser published 
advice rather than gave it in person. The DC enjoined petr 
from giving investment advice in person or over his telephone 
"hotline" service. The DC denied the injuntion against the 
newsletters, and refused to order petr to disgorge his 
subscription receipts. 
Resp appealed to the CA2, which reversed. Judge Oakes 
wrote the majority, joined by Judge Van Graafeiland, who filed 
a concurrence. Judge Brieant, sitting by designation, filed a 
dissent. The majority granted the injunction and upheld the ----. 
SEC's position on two separate grounds. 
First, the revocation of petr's registration under the 
Advisers Act was simply a valid regulation of commercial 
activity, much like professsional licensing. Petr's 
newsletters fit squarely within the Advisor Act's definition 
of publications "engage[d] in the business of advising others 
... as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities." 15 U.S.C. 
§80b-2(11). As this Court stated in Ohralick v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978), government "does not lose 
its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to 
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the public whenever speech is a component of that activity." 
For example, no one would contend that a disbarred lawyer 
could publish and sell legal advice. 
Second, the majority stated that petr's conduct was 
regulable as commercial speech. The CA held that the 
commercial speech concept was not limited to commercial 
advertising, and the potential for deception presented here 
permitted the SEC to ban commercial speech that would likely 
be deceptive. This was especially true considering Congress' 
mandate to the SEC to regulate securities markets. The court 
noted, "In light of Lowe's history of deceptive, criminal 
conduct as an investment adviser, his publications may fairly 
be characterized as potentially deceptive commercial speech" 
that may be banned. The CA noted that its opinion did not 
preclude petr from writing in bona fide newspapers, which are 
exempt regulation under the Advisers Act. 
The concurring opinion simply reiterated that if the 
giving of investment advice by an unregistered adviser is 
unlawful, then a court should be able to prohibit it, whether 
spoken or printed. The concurrence noted that a court could 
certainly grant injunctive relief to restrain the unlawful 
trade practices of a newspaper. 
The dissenting opinion tracked the DC's holding. The ~ 
dissent noted that investment newsletters are differe~t _!!om 
personal investment advice much like "Prevention Magazine" is 
different from personal medical advice. Both a newsletter and 
a magazine travel through the mail, arrive several days after 
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the news is fresh, and offer no advice tailored to the 
~ ----------------
reader's individual situation. Because petr was not selling 
securities or advertising them, the newsletters did not 
constitute "commercial speech." The dissent stressed that 
each Supreme Court commercial speech case has arisen in the 
contest of product or service advertising. Petr's 
newsletters, conveying information, opinion, and analysis of 
politics and economics, went beyond mere advertising. The 
newsletters were "truthful information relevant to important 
social issues" which this Court held protected against 
content-based regulation in Bolger v. Young Drug Products 
Corp., 51 USLW 4961 (1983). 
The dissent distinguished the newsletters from the 
commercial speech like that described in Virginia Pharmacy 
Board, where the author: 
does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural 
philosophical or political. He does not wish to report any 
newsworthy fact, or to make generalizerd observations even 
about commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communicate 
is simply this: "I will sell you X prescription drug at Y 
price." 425 u.s. at 761. 
The dissent stressed the evil of prior restraint and stated 
that, even in the regulated field of securities, the SEC's 
censorship was more extreme than necessary to effectuate the 
aims of Congress. 
Petr did not seek rehearing but instead filed this timely 
/ 
petition. Petr is joined by the Financial Publishers of 
America, a trade group of which petr is not a member. They 
file a motion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and 
- ~ -
also file a lucid and concise brief in support of the cert 
petition. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr: The CA erred when it likened the 
requested injuction to the regulation of professionals. Petr 
is a publisher of fully protected speech. Resp seeks a prior 
restraint based on past misconduct, a sure transgression of 
the First Amendment because it silences petr forever. 
There has been no showing, ever, that petr disseminated 
false or misleading information from any of his publications 
or that petr used his publications to personally profit from 
the sale or purchase of securities. This Court's recent 
/ 
decision in Bose v. Consumers Union, 52 USLW 4513 (1984) shows 
that the publication of information and opinions about 
products offered to the public by others is protected under 
the First Amendment. 
Even if petr's newsletters fall under the classification 
of commercial speech, the CA failed to follow the rules set 
down by this Court in those cases. There was no showing that 
the speech was likely to be deceptive. The CA also failed to 
show that complete suppression of petr's speech is no more 
extensive than necessary to protect the public's interest. 
Potential Amici: The Advisers Act can be read flexibly to 
protect petr's rights yet further the SEC's interests in 
policing investment advisers. The goal of the Act is 
disclosure, not censorship; the SEC could order petr to -
disclose his prior convictions in his publications. Besides 
disclosure, the SEC may provide for ample post-publication 
- 9 -
sanctions. It has no power to review or censor before 
publication, and total prior restraint clashes with the 
fundamental First Amendment guarantee. 
Resp: The CA is correct and its decision does not conflict 
with any other CA's. It is consistent with several decisions 
handed down by the CA7 under the Advisers Act and the 
Commodity Exchange Act. 
Providing investment advice is commercial ativity in 
which speech is "an essential but subordinate component." 
Ohralik. Like advertising, the newsletters do not provide a 
forum for social, political, or religious information. 
Instead, newsletters merely propose commercial transactions. 
Accordingly, they may be regulated as commercial speech. 
Moreoever, the First Amendment cannot preclude bona fide 
occupational licensing which is what the SEC engaged in by 
revoking petr's registration. 
Resp also raises the specter of "scalping," where an 
adviser buys a stock and touts it, or shorts a stock and 
criticizes it, hoping for a personal gain on the basis of his 
published advice. The SEC must regulate the speech of 
investment advisers to prevent scalping. Resp concludes, 
without explanation, that the regulation of petr's commercial 
speech was not broader than necessary to protect the public's 
interest. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr is wrong when he states that he is 
silenced forever. He has only been precluded from issuing a 
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very specific type of publication. Nevertheless, I think the 
CA was in error. 
First, I am ~convinced that petr's . newslet~s~ual~fy ~ 
on~~--c_o_mmercia~~· They are not advertising; they do ~ 
not propose an economic relationship between the publisher and 
reader. Investment newsletters carry a breadth of 
information. Petr's newsletters simply did not recite 
securities prices, they contained general observations and 
assessments of the securities markets, and descriptions of 
trends, strategies, and recommendations. To be sure, petr's 
newsletters are primarily economic, but I find it hard to 
believe that the framers -- economic men all -- did not wish 
fully to protect the publication of truthful economic 
information and commentary. The type of information carried 
in petr's newsletters is needed by the public in a self-
governing free enterprise society. 2democratic society. 
In Youngs Drug Products, supra, the Court defined the 
"core notion" of commercial speech as "speech which does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 4963. The 
2The information contained in petr's newsletters is much more 
than the mere credit information contained in the reports at 
issue in Dun &-sradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, No. 83-18 
{held over for 1984 term). Petr's newsletters, and others like 
them, discuss economic, social, and political trends. This is 
closer to the fieart o1 wnat the first amendment seeks to protect 
than a mere factual credit report. An investment newsletter 
discusses matters of general ~ublic concern. It may, for 
example, discuss- the reasonsor the strength of the Dollar and 
the fall of the Yen. It may praise or excoriate the Federal 
Reserve Board. 
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Court there held that condom pamphlets containing health 
information were commercial speech because they were 
advertisements, referred to a specific product, and proposed a 
further economic relationship between the publisher and 
seller. Investment newsletters do none of these things. 
Newsletters resemble consumer education guides more than they 
do advertisements. 
Even if the traditional regulation of investment ~ 
newsletters and their primary economic purpose qualify them as ~ ~ 
commercial speech, I still think the CA erred. This Court 
commercial speech in 
~ Central Hudson Gas and Elec Cor • v. 
( 4 4 7 U.S. - 55-7- tl--980) (emphasis added) : 
Public Service Comm'n, ~~19 ~ 
At the outset, we must determine whether the 
expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come 
within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it 
is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest. 
Petr's newsletters concern lawful activity and there has 
been no showing that they are misleading. Petr's prior 
convictions were unrelated to the publication of newsletters. 
The CA's conclusion that petr's convictions show the 
publications to be potentially misleading is pure conjecture. 
At any rate, "potentially misleading" not the test; testimony 
in the DC showed petr's newsletters were truthful and his 
readers were pleased. 
~ 
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The SEC's injunction is more extensive than necessary to 
advance the governmental interest. The SEC could require 
disclosure of petr's New York crimes, especially the 
misdemeanors stemming from his practice as an adviser. 
Disclosure is the heart of federal securities regulation. It 
would further the government interest at much lesser cost to 
petr's First Amendment rights than would a prior restraint. 
The SEC also possesses a full array of post-publication 
remedies to lodge against petr if he is ever found to publish 
false or misleading information or if he ever practices 
"scalping." [He has never been accused of scalping and resp's 
discussion of this is a straw man.] 
This is a constitutional issue of importance which has 
sparked dissent and four opinions from the four jurists below. 
It promises to recur. I think it is worthy of a grant. I do 
not, however, think that the Advisers Act can be construed in 
such a nimble way as the DC did below. 
I recommend grant, and suggest that the amicus motion 
should be granted. 
There is a response. 
July 24, 1984 
There. 
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Justice Powell , 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Stevens 
APR 3 1985 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
.. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1911 
CHRISTOPHER L. LOWE, ET AL., PETITIONER v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether petitioners may be permanently 
enjoined from publishing nonpersonalized investment advice ~ .rx.._, 
and commentary in securities newsletters because they are L . 1 ~ ~ 
not registered as investment advisers under § 203(c) of the ;2..;r~" '' 7 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Act), 15 U.S. C. ~ J/vl . . 
§80b-3(c). ' ~ 
Christopher Lowe is the president and principal share-~
holder of Lowe Management Corporation. From 1974 until • 
1981, the corporation was registered as an investment ad-~, 
viser under the Act. 1 During that period Lowe was con-
victed of misappropriating funds of an investment client, of 
engaging in business as an investment adviser without filing 
a registration application with New York's Department of 
Law, of tampering with evidence to cover up fraud of an in-
vestment client, and of stealing from a bank. 2 Conse-
quently, on May 11, 1981, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission), after a full hearing before an ad-
ministrative law judge, entered an order revoking the 
registration of the Lowe Management Corporation, and or-
1 In the Matter of Lowe Management Corp. , [1981 Transfer Binder], 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 82,873, 84,321 (May 11, 1981). 
2 /d., at 84,321-84,323. 
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dering Lowe not to associate thereafter with any investment 
adviser. 
In fashioning its remedy, the Commission took into account 
the fact that petitioners' "are now solely engaged in the busi-
ness of publishing advisory publications." The Commission 
noted that unless the registration was revoked, petitioners 
.. would be "free to engage in all aspects of the advisory busi-
ness" and that even their publishing activities afforded them 
"opportunities for dishonesty and self-dealing." 3 
A little over a year later, the Commission commenced this 
action by filing a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that 
Lowe, the Lowe Managment Corporation, and two other cor-
porations, 4 were violating the Act, and that Lowe was violat-
ing the Commission's order. The principal charge in the 
complaint was that Lowe and the three corporations (Peti-
tioners), were publishing two investment newsletters and 
soliciting subscriptions for a stock-chart service. The com-
plaint alleged that, through those publications, the petition-
ers were engaged in the business of advising others "as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities 
. . . and as a part of a regular business . . . issuing reports 
3 The Commission wrote: 
"We do not seek to punish respondents but, in light of their egregious mis-
conduct, we must protect the public from the future harm at their hands. 
In evaluating the public interest requirements in this case, we have taken 
into account respondents' statement that they are now solely engaged in 
the business of publishing advisory publications. However, respondents 
are still free to engage in all aspects of the advisory business. And, as the 
law judge noted, even their present activities afford numerous 'oppor-
tunites for dishonesty and self-dealing.' 
"Under all the circumstances, we are convinced that the public interest 
requires the revocation of registrant's investment adviser registration, and 
a bar of Lowe from association with any investment adviser.'' !d., at 
84,324. 
' The other two corporations are the Lowe Publishing Corporation and 
the Lowe Stock Chart Service, Inc. 
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concerning securities." 5 Because none of the petitioners 
was registered or exempt from registration under the Act, 
the use of the mails in connection with the advisory business 
allegedly violated § 203(a) of the Act. The Commission 
prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the further 
distribution of petitioners' investment advisory publications; 
·· for a permanent injunction enforcing compliance with the 
·, order of May 11, 1981; and for other relief. 6 
Although three publications are involved in this litigation, 
only one need be described. A typical issue of the Lowe In-
vestment and Financial Letter contained general commen-
tary about the securities and bullion markets, reviews of 
market indicators and investment strategies, and specific 
recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks and 
bullion. The newsletter advertised a "telephone hotline" 
over which subscribers could call to get current information. 
The number of subscribers to the newsletter ranged from 
3,000 to 19,000. It was advertised as a semi-monthly publi-
cation, but only eight issues were published in the 15 months 
after the entry of the 1981 order. 7 
5 App. 18. 
• !d., at 23-26. 
7 App. 32, 78-85. The Lowe Stock Advisory had only 278 paid subscrib-
ers and had published only 4 issues between May 1981 and its last issue in 
March 1982. It also analyzed and commented on the securities and bullion 
markets, but specialized in lower-priced stocks. Subscribers were advised 
that they could receive periodic letters with updated recommendations 
about specific securities and also could make use of the telephone hotline. 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 
(EDNY 1983). Petitioners advertised the Lowe Chart Service as a weekly 
publication that would contain charts for all securities listed on the New 
York and American Stock Exchanges, and for the 1200 most actively 
traded over-the-counter stocks, as well as charts on gold and silver prices 
and market indicators. Unlike the other two publications, it did not pro-
pose to offer any specific investment advice. Although there were ap-
proximately 40 subscribers, no issues were published. Ibid.; App. 32. 
The regular subscription rate was $325 for 3 months or $900 for 1 year. 
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Subscribers who testified at the trial criticized the lack of 
regularity of publication, 8 but no adverse evidence concern-
ing the quality of the publications was offered. There was 
no evidence that Lowe's criminal convictions were related to 
the publications;9 no evidence that Lowe had engaged in any 
trading activity in any securities that were the subject of ad-
·- vice or comment in the publications; and no contention "that 
any of the information published in the advisory services had 
been false or materially misleading." 10 
For the most part, the District Court denied the Commis-
sion the relief it requested. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (EDNY 1983). 
The court did enjoin petitioners from giving information to 
their subscribers by telephone, individual letter, or in per-
son, but it refused to enjoin them from continuing their publi-
cation activities or to require them to disgorge any of the 
earnings from the publications. 11 The District Court ac-
knowledged that the face of the statute did not differentiate 
between persons whose only advisory activity is the "publica-
tion of impersonal investment suggestions, reports and 
analyses," and those who rendered person-to-person advice, 
but concluded that constitutional considerations suggested 
the need for such a distinction. 12 Mter determining that pe-
titioners' publications were protected by the First Amend-
ment, the District Court held that the Act must be construed 
to allow a publisher who is willing to comply with the existing 
8 App. 38, 42, 46, 58. 
9 In addition to the 1977 and 1978 convictions that gave rise to the Com-
mission's 1981 order, in 1982, Lowe was convicted on two counts of theft by 
deception through the issuance of worthless checks. App. 74-76. 
10 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp., at 1359. 
11 The District Court also rejected the Commission's claim that the publi-
cations were fraudulent because they did not disclose Lowe's criminal con-
victions or the revocation of the registration of Lowe Management Cor-
poration, noting that the Commission had not· promulgated any rules 
requiring such disclosure. !d., at 1371. 
12 !d., at 1365. 
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reporting and disclosure requirements to register for the lim-
ited purpose of publishing such material and to engage in 
such publishing. 13 
A splintered panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed. Securities and Exchange Commssion v. 
Lowe, 725 F. 2d 892 (1984). The majority first held that pe-
.. titioners were engaged in business as "investment advisers" 
within the ·meaning of the Act. It concluded that the Act 
does not distinguish between person-to-person advice and im-
personal advice given in printed publications. 14 Rather, in 
its view, the key statutory question was whether the exemp-
tion in § 202(11)(D) for "the publisher of any bona fide news-
paper, news magazine, or business or financial publication of 
general and regular circulation" applied to the petitioners. 
Relying on its decision in SEC v. Wall Street Transcript 
Corp., 422 F. 2d 1371 (1970), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 958 
(1970), the Court of Appeals concluded that the exemption 
was inapplicable. 15 
Next, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' constitu-
tional claim, reasoning that this case "involves precisely the 
kind of regulation of commercial activity permissible under 
the First Amendment." 16 Moreover, it held that Lowe's his-
tory of criminal conduct while acting as an investment ad-
viser justified the characterization of his publications "as po-
tentially deceptive commercial speech." 17 The Court of 
18 !d., at 1369. The District Court wrote, "When a publisher who has 
been denied registration or against whom sanctions have been invoked 
fully complies with the record, reporting and disclosure requirements 
under the Act, he must be allowed to register for the purpose of publishing 
and to publish." Ibid. 
1
• Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lowe, 725 F. 2d 892, 896-897 
(1984). 
15 !d., at 898. 
16 !d., at 900. The Court additionally rejected petitioners' claim that 
"the Act violates equal protection by subjecting investment newsletters, 
but not bona fide newsletters, to regulation." Id., at 900, n. 5. 
17 !d., at 901. 
' . 
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Appeals reasoned that a ruling that petitioners "may not sell 
their views as to the purchase, sale, or holding of certain se-
curities is no different from saying that a disbarred lawyer 
may not sell legal advice." 18 Finally, the court noted that its 
holding was limited to a prohibition against selling advice to 
clients about specific securities. 19 Thus, the Court of Ap-
.. peals apparently assumed that petitioners could continue 
publishing their newsletters if their content was modified to 
exclude any advice about specific securities. 20 
One judge concurred separately, although acknowledging 
his agreement with the court's opinion. 21 The dissenting 
judge agreed that Lowe may not hold himself out as a regis-
18 I d., at 902. 
19 At the end of its opinion, the Court of Appeals wrote: 
"Finally, we note what this holding does not entail. Lowe is not prohib-
ited from publishing or stating his views as to any matter of current inter-
est, economic or otherwise, such as the likelihood of war, the trend in inter-
est rates, whether the next election will affect market conditions, or 
whether future enforcement of the Anti-Dumping Act to protect basic 
American smokestack industry from foreign competition is likely. He is 
not prohibited from publishing a newspaper of general interest and circula-
tion. Nor is he prohibited from publishing recommendations in somebody 
else's bona fide newspaper as an employee, editor, or writer. What he is 
prohibited from doing is selling to clients advice and counsel, analysis and 
reports as to the value of specific securities or as to the advisability of in-
vesting in, purchasing or selling or holding specific securities." Ibid. 
It appended the following footnote: 
"We leave to another day the question whether a publication dealing only 
with market indicators generally or making recommendations only as to 
groups of securities (e. g., air transport, beverages-brewers, mobile 
homes) could be barred on facts such as those of this case." Id., at 902, n. 
7. 
20 The Court of Appeals did not explain whether its apparent unwilling-
ness to grant the Commission all of the relief requested was based on its 
opinion that a modification in the content of the publication would avoid the 
statutory definition of "investment adviser" or on the assumption that peti-
tioners have a constitutional right to publish newsletters omitting specific 
recommendations. 
21 I d., at 902-903. 
·. 
83-1911-0PINION 
LOWE v. SEC 7 
tered investment adviser and may not engage in any fraudu-
lent activity in connection with his publications, but con-
cluded that the majority had authorized an invalid prior 
restraint on the publication of constitutionally protected 
speech. To avoid the constitutional question, he would have 
adopted the District Court's construction of the Act. 22 
I 
We granted certiorari to consider the important constitu-
tional question whether an injunction against the publication 
and distribution of petitioners' newsletters is prohibited by 
the First Amendment. -- U. S. -- (1984). 23 Petition-
ers contend that such an injunction strikes at the very foun-
dation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license 
and censorship, see, e. g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 
444, 451 (1938). Brief of Petitioners 15-19. In response the 
Commission argues that the history of abuses in the securi-
ties industry amply justified Congress' decision to require the 
registration of investment advisers, to regulate their profes-
sional activities, and as an incident to such regulation, to pro-
hibit unregistered and unqualified persons from engaging in 
that business. Brief for the Commission 10; cf. Konigsberg 
v. State Bar of California, 366 U. S. 36, 50-51 (1961). In 
reply, petitioners acknowledge that person-to-person com-
~ !d., at 903. 
23 Petitioners' submission in this Court does not challenge the validity of 
the Commission's order revoking the registration of Lowe Management 
Corporation and barring Lowe from future association with an investment 
adviser. Section 203(e), 15 U. S. C. § 80b-3(e), of the Act authorizes the 
Commission to revoke the registration of any investment adviser if it finds, 
after notice and an opportunity for hearing, that such revocation is in the 
public interest and that the investment adviser has committed certain 
types of crimes. Section 203(f), 15 U. S. C. § 80b-3(f), authorizes the 
Commission to bar the association of any person with an investment ad-
viser if he has committed acts that would justify the revocation of an in-
vestment adviser's registration. Moreover, petitioners do not challenge 
the District Court's holding that they may not operate a direct "hot line" 
for subscribers desiring personalized advice. 
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munication in a commercial setting may be subjected to regu-
lation that would be impermissible in a public forum, cf. 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455 (1978), 
but contend that the regulated class-investment advisers-
may not be so broadly defined as to encompass the distribu-
tion of impersonal investment advice and commentary in a 
·· public market. Reply Brief of Petitioners 1-4. 
· In order to evaluate the parties' constitutional arguments, 
it is obviously necessary first to understand, as precisely as 
possible, the extent to which the Act was intended to regu-
late the publication of investment advice and the reasons that 
motivated Congress to authorize such regulation. · More-
over, in view of the fact that we should "not decide a constitu-
tional question if there is some other ground upon which to 
dispose of the case," 24and the further fact that the District 
Court and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals both 
believed that the case should be decided on statutory 
grounds, a careful study of the statute may either eliminate, 
or narrowly limit, the constitutional question that we must 
confront. We therefore begin with a review of the back-
ground of the Act with a particular focus on the legislative 
history describing the character of the profession that Con-
gress intended to regulate. 
II 
As we observed in SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, the "In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 was the last in a series of acts 
designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securities indus-
try, abuses which were found to have contributed to the 
stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 
1930's." 25 The Act had its genesis in the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, which "authorized and directed" 
24 Escambia County, Florida v. Millan,- U. S. -,-(1984) (per 
curiam); see also Atkins v. Parker, -U.S. -, - (1985); Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Justice 
Brandeis, concurring). 
26 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963) (footnote omitted). 
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the Commission "to make a study of the functions and activi-
ties of investment trusts and investment companies ... and 
to report the results of its study and its recommendations to 
the Congress on or before January 4, 1937." 26 Pursuant to 
this instruction, the Commission transmitted to Congress its 
study on investment counsel, investment management, in-
·. vestment supervisory, and investment advisory services. 27 
The Report focused on "some of the more important prob-
lems of these investment counsel organizations;" 28 signifi-
cantly, the report stated that it "was intended to exclude any 
person or organization which was engaged in the business of 
furnishing investment analysis, opinion, or advice solely 
through publications distributed to a list of subscribers and 
did not furnish specific advice to any client with respect to 
securities." 29 
The Report traced the history and growth of investment 
counsel, noting that the profession did not emerge until after 
World War I. 30 In the 1920's "a distinct class of persons . . . 
held themselves out as giving only personalized investment 
advisory service;" rapid growth began in 1929, and markedly 
increased in the mid-1930's in response "to the demands of 
the investing public, which required supervision of its secu-
rity investments after its experience during the depression 
years." 31 
28 49 Stat. 837. 
27 See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, Pursuant to Section 30 of the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Investment Counsel, Investment 
Management, Investment Supervisory, and Investment Advisory Serv-
ices, H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Congress, 2d Sess. (1939) (hereinafter cited 
as Report). 
'lJl !d., at III. 
29 Ibid. 
30 !d., at 3. 
31 I d., at 5. After detailing the geographic distribution, the forms, and 
the sizes of investment-counsel firms, the Report analyzed the affiliations 
of the firms. It noted that "[a]ll investment counsel firms have not re-
83-1911-0PINION 
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Regarding the functions of investment counselors, the Re-
port stated that "[s]ome of the representatives of investment 
counsel firms urged that the primary function of investment 
counselors was 'to render to clients, on a personal basis, com-
petent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the sound 
management of their investments.'" 32 Nevertheless, it 
noted that one investment counselor conceded: 
"[Y]ou have a gradation from individuals who are pro-
fessed tipsters and who do not make any pretense of 
being anything else, all the way up the scale to the type 
of individual, who, as you say, desires to give the impar-
tial scientific professional advice to persons trying to 
plan their economic situation in the light of accomplish-
ing various results, making provision for old age, educa-
tion, and so forth. However, you can readily see ... 
that a very significant part of that problem, as far as we 
stricted their business interests or activities to the supervision of the 
accounts of their investment clients." Id., at 11. Of the investment-
counsel firms surveyed, approximately 5% published investment manuals 
and periodicals; of these latter firms, 80% were without investment-com-
pany clients. Ibid. The Commission posited that affiliations with pub-
lishers of investment manuals and periodicals "may be attributable to the 
fact that research and statistical organizations are not uncommon with 
these businesses." Ibid. The Report also analyzed the nature of services 
of investment-counsel firms to their clients: 
"The powers of investment counsel firms with respect to the management 
of the funds of their investment company clients were either discretionary 
or advisory. Discretionary powers imply the vesting with an investment 
counsel firm control over the client's funds, with the power to make the 
ultimate determination with respect to the sale and purchase of securities 
for the client's portfolio. In contrast, vesting advisory powers with an 
investment counsel firm merely means that the firm may make recommen-
dations to its client, with whom rests the ultimate power to accept or reject 
such recommendations." Id., at 13. 
Approximately one-third of the firms surveyed had discretionary powers, 
id., at 13; however, all firms surveyed rarely assumed "custody of the port-
folio securities of their investment company clients," id., at 15. 
32 I d., at 23. 
' . 
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are concerned, and possibly the most vital one, is, shall 
we say, the individuals on the fringes .... " 33 
Representatives of the industry viewed the functions of in-
vestment counselors slightly differently, concluding that they 
should serve "individuals and institutions with substantial 
funds who require continuous supervision of their invest-
ments and a program of investment to cover their entire eco-
··nomic needs." 34 Turning to the problems of investment 
counselors, the Report concluded that they fell within two 
categories: "(a) the problem of distinguishing between bona 
83 I d., at 25. 
"'Ibid. Moreover, the representatives pointed out there there was a dif-
ference between the functions of investment counselors and investment 
companies: 
" ... the ordinary investment trust of the management type gives its 
holder a diversification, probably beyond the ability of the small investor to 
obtain on his own capital. It also gives him management. It does not 
take any cognizance-the distinction is that it takes no cognizance of his 
total financial position in investing his money for him, and is distinguished 
from investment counsel, in that it gives him no judgment in the matter 
whatever .... " 
"Q. Now, you say the true function as you conceive it, of an investment 
counselor, is to give advice in connection with the specific condition of a 
. particular individual? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. While the investment trust does not have that personal element in it, 
that it manages the funds on an impersonal basis? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. 'Impersonal' being used in the sense that they may try to get a com-
mon denominator, or what they envision their stockholders' condition may 
be, or what would be best for a cross-section of the American public, but 
does not give the advice with the peculiar, particular, specific financial con-
dition of the individual and what he hopes to accomplish, or what purpose. 
"A. Might I also add that in a number of cases at least, as Mr. Dunn said 
yesterday, the investment trust managers do not consider their funds as a 
proper repository for all of an individual's capital. It is not that it doesn't 
consider only his personal peculiarities and needs, but it does not give 
him a complete financial program." ld., at 26-27 (testimony of James 
N. White of Scudder, Stevens & Clark) (emphasis added). 
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fide investment counselors and 'tipster' organizations; and (b) 
those problems involving the organization and operation of 
investment counsel institutions." 35 
The Commission's work "culminated in the preparation and 
introduction by Senator Wagner of the bill which, with some 
changes, became the Investment Advisers Act of 1940." 36 
Senator Wagner's bill, S. 3580, contained two titles; the first, 
.. concerning investment companies, contained a definition of 
"investment adviser," 37 but the second, concerning invest-
Sll I d., at 27. Moreover, industry representatives "felt that investment 
counsel organizations could not completely perform their basic function-
furnishing to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased, and continu-
ous advice regarding the sound management of their investments-unless 
all conflicts of interest between the investment counsel and the client were 
removed." Id., at 28. The Report, near its conclusion, summarized: 
"It was the unanimous opinion of the representatives at the public exami-
nation .. . that, although a voluntary organization would serve some salu-
tary purpose, such an organization could not cope with the most elemental 
and fundamental problem of the investment counsel industry-the invest-
ment counsel 'fringe' which includes those incompetent and unethical indi-
viduals of organizations who represent themselves as bona fide investment 
counselors. These individuals and organizations not only could not meet 
the requirements of membership, but because of the nature of their activi-
ties would not even consider voluntarily submitting to supervision or polic-
ing." Id., at 34. 
36 SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S., at 189. 
:rr S. 3580 contained the following definition of "investment adviser:" 
"'Investment adviser' means any person who, for compensation, engages 
in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing 
in, purchasing or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of 
a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning 
securities; but does not include (A) a bank; (B) any lawyer, accountant, 
engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services is solely inci-
dental to the practice of his profession; (C) the publisher of any bona fide 
newspaper or newsmagazine of general circulation; or (D) such other per-
sons, not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may desig-
nate by rules and regulations or order." Hearings on S. 3580 before Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency United 
States Senate, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 27 (1940) (Senate Hearings). 
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ment advisers, did not. After the introduction of S. 3580, a 
Senate subcommittee held lengthy hearings at which numer-
ous statements concerning investment advisers were re-
ceived. 38 One witness distinguishing the investment-counsel 
profession from investment firms and businesses, explained: 
"It is a personal-service profession and depends for its 
success upon a close and confidential relationship be-
tween the investment-counsel .firm and its client. It re-
quires frequent and personal contact of a professional 
nature between us and our clients . ... We must estab-
lish with each client a relationship of trust and conji-
It is noteworthy that the exclusion for publishers in clause (C) in S. 3580 is 
not as broad as the exclusion in the final draft of the Act. See infra, n. 42. 
38 Douglas T. Johnston, Vice President of the Investment Counsel Asso-
ciation of America, stated in part: 
"The definition of 'investment adviser' as given in the bill, in spite of cer-
tain exclusions, is quite broad and covers a number of services which are 
entirely different in their scope and in their methods of operation. For 
example, as we read the definition, among others, it would include those 
companies which publish manuals of securities such as Moody's, Poor's, and 
so forth; it would include companies issuing weekly investment letters such 
as Babson's, United Business Service, Standard Statistics, and so forth; it 
would include those tipsters who through newspaper advertisements offer 
. to send, for a nominal price, a list of stocks that are sure to go up; it would 
include certain investment banking and brokerage houses which maintain 
investment advisory departments and make charges for services rendered; 
and it would include those firms which operate on a professional basis and 
which have come to be recognized as investment counsel. 
"Just why it is thought to be in the public interest at this time to require all 
the above services to register with, and be regulated by, the Federal Gov-
ernment we do not know .. .. 
"I have mentioned certain important exceptions or exclusions in the defini-
tion of 'investment advisers'; one of the principal of these is lawyers. 
Probably in the aggregate more investment advice is given by lawyers 
than by all other advisers combined. I only want to point out that in so 
acting they are not functioning strictly as lawyers. So far as I know, no 
courses on investments are part of a law school curriculum, nor in passing 
bar examinations does a lawyer have to pass a test on investment." Sen-
ate Hearings 711-712. 
' . 
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dence designed to last over a period of time because eco-
nomic forces work themselves out slowly. Business and 
investment cycles last for years and our investment 
plans have to be similarly long-range. No investment 
counsel firm could long remain in business or be of real 
benefit to clients except through such long-term associa-
tions .... Judgment of the client's circumstances and of 
the sou_ndness of his financial objectives and of the risks 
" he may assume. Judgment is the root and branch of the 
decisions to recommend changes in a client's security 
holdings. If the investment counsel profession, as we 
have described it, could not offer this kind of judgment 
with its supporting experience and information, it would 
not have anything to sell that could not be bought in al-
most any bookstore .... Furthermore, our clients are 
not unsophisticated in financial matters. They are re-
sourceful men and women of means who are very critical 
in their examination of our performance. If they disap-
prove of our activities, they cancel their contracts with 
us, which eliminates our only source of income. . . . We 
are quite clearly not 'hit and run' tipsters, nor do we deal 
with our clients at arms' length through the advertising 
columns of the newspapers or the mails; in fact, we re-
gard it as a major defeat if we are unable to have fre-
quent personal contact with a client and with his asso-
ciates and dependents. We do not publish for general 
distribution a statistical service or compendium of gen-
eral economic observations or financial recommenda-
tions. To use a hackneyed phrase, our business is 'tai-
lor-made.'" 39 
39 /d., at 713-716 (testimony of Charles M. O'Hearn) (emphasis added); 
see also id., at 719 ("The relationship of investment counsel to his client is 
essentially a personal one involving trust and confidence. The investment 
counselor's sole function is to render to his client professional advice con-
cerning the investment of his funds in a manner appropriate to that client's 
needs") (statement of Alexander Standish); id., at 724 (the "function ofren-
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David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust Study, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, summarized the ex-
tent of the proposed legislation: "If you have been convicted 
of a crime, you cannot be an investment counselor and you 
cannot use the mails to perpetrate a fraud," Senate Hearings, 
at 996. Schenker provided the Committee with a significant 
report prepared by the Research Department of the Illinois 
'"Legislative .Council. Ibid. Referring to possible regulation 
of investment counsel in the State of Illinois, the report 
stated in part: 
"Regulatory statutes concerning investment counselors 
appear to exempt from their provisions those who fur-
nish advice without remuneration or valuable consider-
ation, apparently because it is thought impracticable to 
regulate such gratuitous services. Newspapers and 
journals generally also seem to be excluded although this 
is not explicitly stated in the statutes, the exemption ap-
parently being based on general constitutional and legal 
principles. . . . A particular problem in defining the 
application of a law regulating investment counselors 
arises from the existence of individuals and firms who 
furnish investment advice solely by means of publica-
tions. Insofar as such individuals and firms also ren-
der specialized advice to individual clients, they might 
be subject to any regulatory measure that may be 
adopted. The question arises, however, as to whether 
or not services which give the same general advice to all 
their clients, by means of some circular or other publica-
dering to clients-on a personal, professional basis-competent, unbiased, 
and continuous advice regarding the sound management of their invest-
ments, has had a steady growth") (statement of Dwight C. Rose, Presi-
dent, Investment Counsel Association of America); id., at 750 ("Invest-
ment counsel have sprung into being in response to the requirements of 
individuals for individual personal advice with respect to the handling of 
their affairs ... the whole genesis of investment counseling is a personal 
professional relationship") (testimony of Rudolf P. Berle, General Counsel, 
Investment Counsel Association of America). 
16 
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tion, are actually engaged in a type of investment coun-
seling as to which regulation is feasible. . . . These in-
vestment services which function through publications 
sent to their subscribers, rather than through individual-
ized advice, would present several difficulties not found 
in regulating investment counselors generally. In the 
first place, the large number of agencies publishing in-
vestment facts and interpretations is well known, and a 
large administrative staff would be required to enforce 
detailed registration. Secondly, such information is 
supplied both by newspapers and by specialized financial 
journals and services. The accepted rights of freedom of 
the press and due process of law might prevent any gen-
eral regulation and perhaps supervision over particular 
types of publications, even if the advertisements of these 
publications occasionally quite exaggerate the value of 
the factual information which is supplied. That the 
constitutional guarantee of liberty of the press is appli-
cable to publications of all types, and not only to news-
papers, has been clearly indicated by the United States 
Supreme Court [citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U. S. 444 (1938)] . ... To the problem of formulating 
reasonable and practicable regulations for the factual 
services must, accordingly, be added the legal and con-
stitutional difficulties inherent in the attempted regula-
tion of any individual or organization functioning primar-
ily by means of published circulars and volumes. 
However, liberty of the press is not an absolute right, 
and some types of regulation may be both constitutional 
and feasible, assuming that regulation of some sort is 
thought desirable. Such regulation could probably not 
legally take the form of licensing publications or prohibit-
ing certain types of publications. Regulation of the pub-
lishing of investment advice in order to conform with 
constitutional requirements, would probably have to be 
confined to punishing, by civil or criminal penalties, 
' . 
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those who perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate frauds or 
other specific acts declared to be contrary to law .... It 
may be thought desirable specifically to exclude from 
regulation the publishers of generalized investment in-
formation, along with those who furnish economic ad-
vice generally. This may be done by carefully defining 
the term 'investment counselor' so as to exclude 'any per-
son or organization which engages in the business of fur-
nishing investment analysis, opinion, or advice solely 
through publications distributed to a list of subscribers 
and not furnishing specific advice to any client with re-
spect to securities, and also persons or organizations 
furnishing only economic advice and not advice relating 
to the purchase or sale of securities."140 (Emphasis 
added). 
Mter the Senate subcommittee hearings on S. 3580, and 
after meetings attended by representatives of investment-
adviser firms, a voluntary association of investment advisers 
and the Commission, a revised bill, S. 4108, was reported by 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. In there-
port accompanying the revised bill, the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency wrote: 
"Not only must the public be protected from the frauds 
and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and 
touts, the bona fide investment adviser must be safe-
guarded against the stigma of the activities of these indi-
viduals. Virtually no limitations or restrictions exist 
with respect to the honesty and integrity of individuals 
who may solicit funds to be controlled, managed, and su-
pervised. Persons who may have been convicted or en-
joined by courts because of perpetration of securities 
fraud are able to assume the role of investment advis-
ers .... Title II recognizes that with respect to a certain 
class of investment advisers, a type of personalized rela-
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tionship may exist with their clients. As a conse-
quence, this relationship is a factor which should be con-
sidered in connection with the enforcement by the 
Commission of the provisions of this bill." 41 (Emphasis 
added). 
S. 4108 was introduced before the House of Represent-
··atives as H. R. 10065. 42 After additional hearings, 43 the 
•• S. Rep. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1940) (emphasis added). 
42 Hearings on H. R. 10065 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. , 3d Sess. 1 (1940) (House 
hearings). The bill contained two definitions of "investment adviser," one 
in Title I (investment companies) and the other in Title II (investment ad-
visers). The latter definition read, in part: 
"'Investment adviser' means any person who, for compensation, engages 
in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing 
in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part 
of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning 
securities; but does not include . . . (D) the publisher of any bona fide 
newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general 
and regular circulation. . . . " I d. , at 45. 
Whereas the exclusion for publishers in clause (C) of the exclusion in S. 
3580 only mentioned newspapers of general circulation, the exclusion in 
. clause (D) of H. R. 10065 also encompasses "business or financial" publica-
tions. See supra, n. 37. 
42 Hearings,. before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce House of Representatives on H. R. 10065, 76th Cong., 
3d Sess. (1940). During the hearings, testimony about the personal 
nature of the investment-counseling profession was again emphasized: 
"When the hearings were held on the bill before the Senate committee the 
association opposed it. We opposed it for three general reasons: First, in 
the original bill there was confusion between investment counsel and in-
vestment trusts. We felt that the personal confidential relationship exist-
ing between investment counsel and his client was so very much different 
from the commodity of investment trust shares which investment trusts 
were engaged in selling, that any legislation to regulate the two different 
activities should be incorporated in separate acts. In the bill we felt that 
our clients were not properly protected in their confidential relation-
ship. . . . Following the hearings before the Senate subcommittee, we 
had conferences with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and all of 
' . 
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Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce wrote in its 
report accompanying the bill: 
"The essential purpose of title II of this bill is to protect 
the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of un-
scrupulous tipsters and touts and to safeguard the hon-
est investment adviser against the stigma of the activi-
ties of these individuals by making fraudulent practices 
by investment advisers unlawful. The title also recog-
nizes the personalized character of the services of invest-
ment advisers and especial care has been taken in the 
drafting of the bill to respect this relationship between 
investment advisers and their clients." 44(Emphasis 
added). 
The definition of "investment adviser" included in Title II 
when the Act was passed, 54 Stat. 848-849, is identical to the 1, ~J-11 rtJc.IIA-11-~" 
definition before the Court today. " ,.-~st'e.d~ 
III 
The basic definition of an "investment adviser" in the Act 
reads as follows: 
"'Investment adviser' means any person who, for com-
pensation, engages in the business of advising others, 
either directly or through publications or writings, as to 
the value of securities or as to the advisability of invest-
ing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for com-
pensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning 
securities. . . . " 45 
Petitioners' newsletters are distributed "for compensation 
and as part of a regular business" and they contain "analyses 
our objections have been satisfactorily adjusted. . . . The Investment 
Counsel Association of America unqualifiedly endorses the present 
bill. . . ¥" !d., at 92 (statement of Dwight Rose, representing Investment 
Counsel ssociation of America, New York, N. Y.) . 
.. H. . Rep. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940) (emphasis added). 
46 15 . S. C. § 80b-2(a)(ll). 
I 
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or reports concerning securities." Thus, on its face, the 
statutory definition applies to petitioners. The definition, 
however, is far from absolute. The Act excludes several cat-
egories of persons from its definition of an investment ad-
viser, lists certain investment advisers who need not be reg-
istered and also authorizes the Commission to exclude "such 
other person" as it may designate by rule or order. 46 
·· One of the statutory exclusions is for "the publisher of any 
bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial 
publication of general and regular circulation." 47 Although 
neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history defines 
the precise scope of this exclusion, two points seem tolerably 
clear. Congress did not intend to exclude publications that 
are distributed by investment advisers as a normal part of 
the business of servicing their clients. The legislative his-
tory plainly demonstrates that Congress was primarily inter-
ested in regulating the business of rendering personalized in-
vestment advice, including publishing activities that are a 
normal incident thereto. On the other hand, Congress, 
plainly sensitive to First Amendment concerns, wanted to 
make clear that it did not seek to regulate the press through 
the licensing of non-personalized publishing activities. 
Congress was undoubtedly aware of two major First 
· Amendment cases that this Court decided before the enact-
ment of the Act. The first, Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 
283 U. S. 697 (1931), established that "liberty of the press, 
and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion 
by state action." Id., at 707. In Near, the Court emphati-
cally stated that the "chief purpose" of the press guarantee 
was "to prevent previous restraints upon publication," id., at 
713, and held that the Minnesota nuisance statute at issue in 
that case was unconstitutional because it authorized a prior 
restraint on publication. 
"'§§ 80b-2(a), 80b-3(b), 80b-6(a). 
'
7 § 80b-2(a)(ll)(D). 
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Almost seven years later, the Court decided Lovell v. City 
of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), a case that was expressly 
noted by the Commission during the Senate subcommittee 
hearings. In striking down an ordinance prohibiting the dis-
tribution of literature within the city without a permit, the 
Court wrote: 
"We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. 
· Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its 
character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of 
the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and 
censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press 
was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. 
It was against that power that John Milton directed his 
assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed 
Printing." And the liberty of the press became initially 
a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could 
be published only with one.' While this freedom from 
previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded 
as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of 
that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of 
the constitutional provision. . . . 
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers 
and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and 
leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in 
the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine 
and others in our own history aboundantly attest. The 
press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort 
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
opinion. What we have had recent occasion t~ay with 
respect to the vital importance of protecting tJrls essen-
tial liberty from every sort of infringement need not be 
repeated. Near v. Min~esota . ... " Id., at 451-452 
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
The reasoning of Lovell, particularly since the case was cited 
in the legislative history, supports a broad reading of the ex-
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elusion for publishers. 48 
The Court of Appeals relied on its opinion in SEC v. Wall 
Street Transcript Corp., 422 F. 2d 1371 (CA2 1970), cert. de-
nied, 398 U. S. 958 (1970), to hold that petitioners were not 
bona fide newspapers and thus not exempt from the Act's 
registration requirement. In Wall Street Transcript, the 
majority held that the "phrase 'bona fide' newspapers . . . 
means those publications which do not deviate from custom-
ary newspaper accounts to such an extent that there is a like-
lihood that the wrongdoing which the Act was designed to 
prevent has occurred." It reasoned that whether "a given 
publication fits within this exclusion must depend upon the 
nature of its practices rather than upon the purely formal 'in-
dicia of a newspaper' which it exhibits on its face and in the 
size and nature of its subscription list." 422 F. 2d, at 1377. 
The court expressed its concern that an investment adviser 
"might choose to present [information to clients] in the guise 
of traditional newspaper format." I d., at 1378. The Com-
mission, citing Wall Street Transcript, has interpreted the 
exclusion to apply "only where, based on the content, ad-
vertising material, readership and other relevant factors, a 
publication is not primarily a vehicle for distributing invest-
ment advice." 49 
These various formulations recast the statutory language 
without capturing the central thrust of the legislative his-
tory, and without even mentioning the apparent intent of 
Congress to keep the Act free of constitutional infirmities. 
The Act was designed to apply to those persons engaged in 
the investment-advisory profession-those who provide 
48 Time, Inc. v. Regan,- U.S.-,- (1984) (STEVENS, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("In areas where legislation might 
intrude on constitutional guarantees, we believe that Congress, which has 
also sworn to protect the Constitution, would intend to err on the side of 
fundamental constitutional liberties when its legislation implicates those 
liberties"). 
49 Investment Advisers Act Rei. No. 563, 42 Fed. Reg. 2953, n. 1 (1977) 
(codified at 17 CFR § 276). 
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personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns, whether 
by written or verbal communication. The mere fact that a 
publication contains advice and comment about specific se-
curities does not give it the personalized character that iden-
tifies a professional investment adviser. Thus, petitioners' 
publications do not fit within the central purpose of the Act 
.. because they do not offer individualized advice attuned to any 
specific portfolio or to any client's particular needs. On the 
contrary, they circulate for sale to the public at large in a 
free, open market-a public forum in which typically anyone 
may express his views. 
The language of the exclusion, read literally, seems to de-
scribe petitioners' newsletters. Petitioners are "publishers 
of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or fi-
nancial publication." The only modifier that might arguably 
disqualify the newsletters are the words "bona fide." Nota-
bly, however, those words describe the publication rather 
than the character of the publisher; hence Lowe's unsavory 
history does not prevent his newsletters from being "bona 
fide." In light of the legislative history, this phrase trans-
lates best to "genuine"; petitioners' publications meet this 
definition: they are published by those engaged solely in the 
publishing business and are not personal communictions mas-
querading in the clothing of newspapers, news magazines or 
financial publications. Further, petitioners' publications are 
"of general and regular circulation." Although the publica-
tions have not been "regular" in the sense of consistent cir-
culation, the publications have been "regular" in the sense 
important to the securities market: there is no indication that 
they have been timed to specific market activity, or to events 
affecting or having the ability to affect the securities indus-
try, or that they contain false and misleading information. 
The dangers of fraud, deception, or overreaching that mo-
tivated the enactment of the statute are present in personal-
ized communications but are not replicated in publications 
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that are advertised and sold in an open market. 50 To the ex-
tent that the chart service contains factual information about 
past transactions and market trends, and the newsletters 
contain commentary on general market conditions, there can 
be no doubt about the protected character of the communica-
tions, 51 a matter that concerned Congress when the exclusion 
was drafted. The content of the publications and the audi-
.. ence to which they are directed in this case reveal the specific 
limits of the exclusion. As long as the communications be-
tween petitioners and their subscribers remain entirely im-
personal and do not develop into the kind of fiduciary, per-
son-to-person relationships that were discussed at length in 
the legislative history of the Act and that are characteristic of 
investment adviser-client relationships, we believe the publi-
cations are, at least presumptively, within the exclusion and 
thus not subject to registration under the Act. 52 
We therefore conclude that petitioners' publications fall 
within the statutory exclusion for bona fide publications and 
that none of the petitioners is an "investment adviser" as de-
fined in the Act. It follows that neither their unregistered 
50 Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U. S. 447 (1978). It is 
significant that the Commission has not established that petitioners have 
had authority over the funds of subscribers; that petitioners have been del-
egated decisionmaking authority to handle subscribers' portfolios or ac-
counts; or that there have been individualized, investment-related interac-
tions between petitioners and subscribers. 
51 Moreover, because we have squarely held that the expression of opin-
ion about a commercial product such as a loudspeaker is protected by the 
First Amendment, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S. , Inc., --
U. S. --, -- (1984) , it is difficult to see why the expression of an opin-
ion about a marketable security should not also be protected. 
52 The Commission suggests that an investment adviser may regularly 
provide, in newsletter-form, advice to several clients based on recent 
developments, without tailoring the advice to each client's individual 
needs, and that this is the practice of investment advising. Brief for 
Securities and Exchange Commission 34, n. 44. However, the Commis-
sion does not suggest that this "practice" is involved here; thus, we have no 
occasion to address this concern. 
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status, nor the Commission order barring Lowe from asso-
ciating with an investment adviser, provides a justification 
for restraining the future publication of their newsletters. 
It also follows that we need not specifically address the con-
stitutional question we granted certiorari to decide. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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Re: 83-1911 - Lowe v. SEC 
April 4, 1985 
I do not find the legislative history compelling 
enough to overturn the long-standing administrative 
interpretation of the Act, which the Commission was 
implementing in Capital Gains, 375 u.s. 180. Your 
disposal would effectively foreclose the disclosure 
remedies we approved against a publisher of a capital 
gains "report", whom the SEC had treated as an invest-
ment advisor. I would not take that course and would 
not interfere with other available remedies short of 
enjoining publication. Also, although you purport not 
to decide the constitutional issue, you seem to do so, 
see pp. 23, 24, and far too cryptically for me. I thus 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 5, 1985 
Re: 83-1911 - Lowe v. SEC 
Dear Byron: 
Thank you for your note. I think you are correct 
that my proposed draft would foreclose disclosure 
remedies against an unregistered publisher who had no 
person-to-person relationship with his subscribers--at 
least until Congress amended the statute to address 
that specific problem. In Capital Gains, as I read it, 
no question was raised about the defendant's status as 
an investment adviser. The injunctive relief requested 
by the Commission would have applied only "while the 
said Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. is an 
investment adviser." See 375 U.S., at 184 and n. 5. 
Although it may be unusual to treat the 
relationship between such a publisher and five thousand 
subscribers to a report as "fiduciary," the opinion 
seems to rest on the premise that the statute was 
designed to protect "the adviser's fiduciary 
relationship to his clients." Id., at 201. The 
opinion draws a distinction between "arm's-length 
transactions" and practices that operate as a fraud or 
deceit "upon a client," id., at 195, and repeatedly 
describes the recipients-of the report as "clients" 
rather than mere subscribers. See id., at 182, 187, 
188, 189, 190, 191, 192, and 194. The opinion also 
stresses "the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship." See id., at 190 and 
191. I also note that the Act repeatedly-refers to 
"clients." See, e.g., S80b-l(l): §80b-3(b) (1): §80b-
3 (b) (2): §80b-3 (b) (3): §80b-3 (c) (1) (E): §80b-6 (1): 
§ 8 0 b- 6 ( 2 ) : § 8 0 b-6 ( 3 ) • 
As a practical matter, I am not sure there really 
is as much difference between our two positions as 
might appear at first blush. For a holding that an 
unregistered publisher like Lowe has a constitutional 
-2-
right to publish would mean, I suppose, that he could 
continue to publish without disclosing his purchases 
and sales of securities that are the subject of his 
reports. Similarly, the publisher in Capital Gains 
could simply withdraw his registration and go about his 
business. If you respond by suggesting that the 
registration itself provides a badge of reliability, 
the Commission could continue to accept the registered 
status conditioned on compliance with the relief 
requested in Capital Gains. The most significant 
difference, as I see it, is that my proposed 
construction of the statute would leave Congress free 
to draft legislation that would require appropriate 
disclosures even by publishers who might not be 
registered. 
With respect to the constitutional issue, I think 
you are right in suggesting that the draft indicates 
that th~ speech is entitled to some First Amendment 
protection, but the statutory disposition makes it 
unnecessary to indicate whether the justifications for 
the federal legislation are strong enough to enable us 
to sustain either registration or some other 
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Dear John: 
I, too, thought the Commission 1 s construction of 
the statute was a permissible one and was entitled to 
some deference. I also am inclined to agree with Byron 
that the legislative history does not support the weight 
your opinion would give it. I, therefore, shall await 
Byron 1 s concurrence which will follow the conference 
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Dear John, 
For now I will await Byron's separate writing. 
Sincerel~ 
Justice Stevens 
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May 2, 1985 
Re: 83-1911 - Lowe v. SEC 
Dear Byron: 
Your circulation is characteristically well 
written but I do not believe you have adequately 
dealt with the statutory exception. I am drafting 
some footnotes by way of response but may not get 
them circulated before I depart for Durham to attend 
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I am inclined to join Byron's concurrence, but I 
will wait on your next draft. 
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Justice Stevens 
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I found this case more difficult as the writing 
unfolded. I have concluded your analysis is close 
enough to my own that I can join your concurring opinion. 
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